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1103 
Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands 
of Law and Justice 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee.1 In fact, it is so fundamental that the right 
applies to the states as incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2 Additionally, the origins of the jury system date back 
to the guarantee to trial by jury provided in the Magna Charta,3 and 
the Founders universally considered a jury trial in criminal cases to 
be important.4 Notwithstanding its fundamental constitutional 
nature, scholars often severely criticize trial by jury;5 some critics 
even argue that it should be abolished.6 
One particular aspect of trial by jury that has come under attack 
is the jury’s power to nullify a case. Prosecutors, specifically, tend to 
dislike the idea of jury nullification; they expect a conviction when 
they fully prove their case. Cases where racist juries acquitted guilty 
white defendants of violent crimes against blacks in the South give 
weight to prosecutors’ concerns.7 The argument that arises from 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968). 
 3. Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 377, 391 (1996). “The Magna Charta declared that no freeman would be disseized, 
dispossessed, or imprisoned except by judgment of his peers or by the ‘laws of the land.’” Id. at 
391 n.22 (citing RICHARD THOMPSON, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA CHARTA OF KING 
JOHN 85 (Gryphon Editions, Ltd. 1982) (1829)). 
 4. Id. at 425 (quoting Alexander Hamilton: “The friends and adversaries of the plan of 
the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial 
by jury: Or if there is any difference between them, it consists in this; the former regard it as a 
valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 5. Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Trial Jury: Erosion of Jury Power, 5 HOWARD SCROLL 
SOC. J. REV. 1, 1–6 (2002) (noting that much of the criticism of jury trials focuses on the 
incompetence and inefficiencies of juries and that juries are also frequently criticized for 
acquitting guilty defendants). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Consider, for example, the two hung juries in the 
1964 trials of Byron De La Beckwith in Mississippi for the murder of NAACP field secretary 
Medgar Evers, or the 1955 acquittal of J.W. Millam and Roy Bryant for the murder of fourteen-
year-old Emmett Till—shameful examples of how ‘nullification’ has been used to sanction 
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these concerns is that to prevent such injustices, courts should 
preclude juries from nullifying verdicts at all costs. On the other side 
of the debate, defense attorneys tend to favor jury nullification. They 
cite cases in which juries refused to convict abolitionists who 
violated the fugitive slave laws8 as examples of nullification being 
used to fight unjust laws. These opposing arguments represent 
strongly-held beliefs and reveal a deeper tension between the rule of 
law and the implementation of justice. 
This Comment argues that jury nullification is an important tool 
for balancing government interests with individual rights and that 
courts should adopt measures that allow for jury nullification while 
not expressly encouraging it. Jury nullification serves as a check on 
government power by adding a level of discretionary review and by 
allowing common human experience to temper the oft-times rigid 
application of the law.9  
In Part II, this Comment first reviews the basic concepts of jury 
nullification to provide a framework within which to advocate for it. 
Then, Part III addresses jury nullification’s historic role in American 
jurisprudence. Next, Part IV surveys the academic debate for and 
against jury nullification to provide context for this Comment’s 
argument. Finally, this Comment argues in Part V that jury 
nullification creates an appropriate balance between the rule of law 
and the administration of justice and concludes in Part VI with 
suggestions for ways that jurists, attorneys, and judges can allow 
jury nullification without explicitly encouraging it. 
II. JURY NULLIFICATION BASICS 
There are many definitions or descriptions of jury nullification. 
For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines jury nullification: 
A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal 
to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message 
 
murder and lynching.” United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing DAVID 
HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 431–41 (1993); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 60–63, 
250 (1997); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954–1965, at 
38–57, 221–25 (1987)). 
 8. JEFFERY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 
80–82 (1994) (explaining that in the Fugitive Slave Cases, attorneys successfully persuaded 
juries not to convict abolitionists helping slaves and to not send runaway slaves back home to 
the South). 
 9. See infra Part V. 
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about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because 
the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, 
morality, or fairness.10 
Some scholars define jury nullification as the jury’s refusal to convict 
a criminal defendant even though there is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant’s behavior has satisfied the statutory 
elements of a crime.11 Meanwhile, critics refer to jury nullification as 
“the intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding 
judge”12 or “when a jury ignores the law as given by the court and 
chooses instead to play by its own rules.”13 
This Comment defines jury nullification as the jury’s intentional 
choice to acquit a criminal defendant despite proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. In this Comment, jury 
nullification does not include convicting a criminal defendant that 
has not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
definition allows this Comment to advocate for jury nullification 
without asking for courts to allow juries to find defendants guilty 
notwithstanding clear evidence of their innocence. The paper limits 
the definition this way because, while there may be justifications for 
juries to nullify a defendant’s guilt, a jury’s decision to convict 
notwithstanding the evidence inherently violates due process. 
Finally, this Comment will focus exclusively on criminal matters. 
The issue of jury nullification in civil trials, while similar in some 
respects, presents distinct problems. A full exploration of 
nullification in civil trials will have to wait for another time. 
A. Categories of Jury Nullification 
To understand why jury nullification is an important tool for 
balancing government interests with individual rights, one must 
understand the basic justifications that juries have for nullifying. It is 
impossible to know exactly why a jury chooses to acquit against the 
weight of the evidence in every situation, and different members of 
 
 10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 936 (9th ed. 2009). 
 11. Andrew J. Parmenter, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial Oligarchy” Declares War on Jury 
Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 379 (2007) (citing Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within 
the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1997)). 
 12. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 13. Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1997). 
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the jury may have different reasons for reaching their conclusions. 
However, past studies have shown that most instances of jury 
nullification are in response to what the members of the jury 
perceive as unlawful government behavior, unjust laws, or the 
inequitable application of the law.14 
1. Jury nullification as a response to unlawful government behavior 
In the first category of jury nullification—jury nullification in 
response to unlawful government behavior—the government 
correctly and justly applies the law to a criminal defendant’s 
behavior.15 However, in the course of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution, the government commits an objectionable offense, and 
the jury punishes the government by acquitting the defendant.16 
Objectionable offenses could include, but are not limited to, perjured 
testimony or unreasonable searches or seizures.17 In this case, the 
jury makes a value judgment that the government’s inappropriate 
behavior was more reprehensible than the defendant’s.18 Thus, this 
category of jury nullification acts like the exclusionary rule by 
allowing a guilty criminal to escape punishment to discourage 
unacceptable governmental acts.19 
 
 14. These three different categories primarily come from an article by Darryl K. Brown, 
Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997), but other scholars have 
also similarly categorized different classes of jury nullification. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The 
Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 402 (1954) (“Three questions must 
be carefully distinguished: (1) the jury’s duty to declare the law in opposition to what the trial 
judge says the law is; (2) the jury’s duty to decide, pursuant to legal standards laid down by the 
court, whether a given type of conduct or group of events falls within a legal rule; and (3) the 
jury’s duty to inject an element of community sentiment into its resolution of issues upon which 
reasonable men may differ.”). In Darryl K. Brown’s article, he actually identifies four different 
categories of jury nullification. Brown, supra, at 1171. However, his fourth category, nullification 
to uphold illegal and immoral community norms, easily fits into his second and third categories 
(discussed below) because, as seen from the jury’s perspective, nullification to uphold illegal or 
immoral community norms is the same thing as refusing to uphold a law, or an application of 
the law, that the community thinks (although perhaps erroneously) is unjust. 
 15. Brown, supra note 14, at 1172. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. at 1174 (“When faced with a choice between leaving unpunished an official 
violation (perjury, subornation, unconstitutional searches) and one by a private citizen 
(murder), the rule of law may give primary concern to official lawlessness, even given the gravity 
of the privately caused harm.”). 
 19. Id. at 1175. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:31 AM 
1103 Jury Nullification as a Tool 
 1107 
2. Jury nullification as a response to unjust laws 
The second category of jury nullification—nullification in 
response to unjust laws—consists of jury acquittals of a defendant 
who is otherwise guilty under a criminal statute because the jury 
disagrees with content of the statute.20 In these cases, the jury 
reasons that the law is unjust. Thus, the law should never apply 
under any circumstance. 
Prime examples of this category are acquittals of abolitionists 
who were accused under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.21 More 
recent examples include acquittals of defendants accused of violating 
Prohibition laws in the 1920s.22 In these examples, the juries 
acquitted simply because they did not agree with the law. 
3. Jury nullification in response to inappropriate application of the law 
In the third category of jury nullification—jury nullification in 
response to inappropriate application of the law—the jury acquits a 
technically guilty defendant because technical application of the law 
seems unjust given the circumstances of the case.23 In these 
situations, the jury sees no problem with the applicable criminal 
statute. Rather, the jury decides that the prosecutor is unjustly 
applying the law.24 For example, a jury may think that the 
punishment is too severe to fit a specific defendant’s behavior, such 
as when a defendant commits a petty theft but is subject to a “three-
strikes” law.25 
Further, the jury may believe that the purpose of the law poorly 
fits the circumstances of the case.26 For instance, a jury might acquit 
a parent who gives leftover pain pills to an injured child for a 
temporary, harsh pain.27 
 
 
 20. Id. at 1178. 
 21. Id. at 1179 (citing JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 80–85 (1994)). 
 22. Id. at 1179 n.115 (citing HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 291 
(1966)). 
 23. Id. at 1183. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Sim Gill, Salt Lake Cnty. Dist. Attorney, Advanced Criminal Procedure Class 
Presentation at Brigham Young University: Prosecutorial Discretion (Jan. 24, 2013). 
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Finally, a jury may nullify because it believes that the 
government is targeting an economic or racial class.28 This differs 
from nullifying in response to unlawful government behavior 
because, in this instance, the government’s behavior is lawful. It is 
the policy the government endorses by its action (such as patrolling 
more heavily in neighborhoods of racial minorities) that the jury 
finds inappropriate.29 Essentially, this third category of jury 
nullification is a check on prosecutorial and police discretion.30 
B. The Legal Origins and Nature of Jury Nullification 
This Comment now discusses the legal basis of jury nullification. 
It is important to understand the legal basis to rebut arguments that 
nullification is completely illegal and anarchic.  
Neither the United States Constitution31 nor judicial 
precedent32 explicitly authorizes jury nullification. However, as 
discussed in Part III below, juries have frequently employed 
nullification throughout history, thus creating a precedential 
foundation on which to establish nullification’s legality.33 
Additionally, other constitutional protections inherent in a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury necessarily create a 
jury nullification power.34 Specifically, constitutional protections 
effectively create a jury nullification power in three ways. First, the 
jury in a criminal trial has the right to render a general verdict.35 
Second, courts cannot direct a jury to convict no matter how 
convincing the evidence.36 Third, the Double Jeopardy clause 
prevents acquittals from being reversed.37 Thus, practically speaking, 
a jury can nullify, and the court cannot reverse its verdict. 
While courts and scholars almost universally recognize the 
existence of a jury nullification power, there is significant debate as 
 
 28. Brown, supra note 14, at 1185 (citing Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1190. 
 31. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 417. 
 32. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101–02 (1895). 
 33. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 380–92. 
 34. Id. at 417. 
 35. Id. at 379, 417. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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to whether a jury has a right to use that power38 and whether a 
defendant has a right to inform the jury of that power.39 Some 
scholars even argue that the difference between the jury’s power to 
nullify and the jury’s right to nullify is merely semantic, but judges 
have used the semantics to oppose jury nullification and to issue 
opinions limiting it.40 Whatever the case, most jurisdictions have 
little case law addressing the scope of the jury’s power or right to 
nullify.41 Additionally, the frequency of the use of jury nullification 
is difficult to quantify because it is hard to determine exactly why a 
jury delivers a not guilty verdict in every case.42 However, scholars 
estimate that jury nullification happens in about 4% of cases.43 
 
 38. Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury Nullification, and Magna Carta, 22 QUINNIPAC L. 
REV. 651, 653 (2004) (“One of the underlying issues, however, is whether or not juries have a 
right to nullify, or whether it is just an illegal tradition that is tolerated.”). See United States v. 
Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615–16 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A jury has no more ‘right’ to find a ‘guilty’ 
defendant ‘not guilty’ than it has to find a ‘not guilty’ defendant guilty, and the fact that the 
former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the 
power to misapply the law.” (quoting United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 
1983))); cf. Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench and Bar, 
173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 68 (2002) (“It is not only [the juror’s] right, but his Duty . . . to find the 
Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment, and Conscience, tho in Direct 
opposition to the Direction of the Court.” (quoting 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965))). 
 39. Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Korroch & Major Michael J. Davidson, Jury 
Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation for Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 146 (1993) (citing 
United States v. Sloan, 704 Fed. Supp. 880, 884 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that criminal 
defendants do not have a right to jury nullification notwithstanding the nullification power)); see 
also Huestis, supra note 38, at 89–90 (stating that “whether counsel may argue jury nullification” 
is an issue that “remains an open question of law”). 
 40. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 417. 
 41. Huestis, supra note 38, at 71. ”Given the controversial nature of jury nullification, the 
amount of case law on the subject is surprisingly small. . . . One reason for the limited case 
law, however, is that an acquittal does not result in a reported decision. . . . The only reported 
decisions, therefore, are cases in which the judge refused to give the defense-requested 
instructions and the accused was convicted.” Id. at 88. 
 42. A jury may deliver a verdict of not guilty simply because they did not believe that the 
prosecution met its standard of proof or because they jury misunderstood the judge’s 
instructions on the law. However, since jury deliberation is confidential, it is impossible to know 
whether the verdict is a result of nullification or of some other reason. 
 43. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 133 n.14 (citing Weinberg-Brodt, Jury 
Nullification And Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 826 n.5 (1990) (citing H. KALVEN 
& H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58, 116 (1966))) (“In 19% of all criminal trials tried before a 
jury, juries acquit defendants whom judges would have convicted. Of this number, only 21% are 
attributed to jury nullification.”). 
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C. Methods of Limiting or Encouraging Jury Nullification 
Courts possess several methods by which they can either 
encourage or discourage nullification. An understanding of these 
methods deepens understanding of how courts have treated jury 
nullification in the past and helps to frame arguments about the 
validity and efficacy of jury nullification. Specifically, these methods 
include jury instructions, closing arguments, voir dire, enforcement of 
the jury’s oath to follow the law, and admitting evidence in support 
of a nullifying theory. 
One of the most obvious ways to encourage jury nullification is 
to instruct the jury that it can acquit even if the prosecutor proves 
the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.44 In contrast, 
including an instruction that the jury must impartially apply and 
follow the law, no matter what, would discourage nullification.45 
Similarly, including a jury instruction explicitly prohibiting the jury 
from nullifying could limit jury nullification. But such an instruction, 
merely through mentioning nullification to the jurors, also has the 
potential to encourage nullification.46 In virtually all jurisdictions, 
jury instructions allowing nullification are prohibited.47 
Courts may also limit or encourage jury nullification by 
restricting or allowing closing arguments regarding jury 
nullification.48 By allowing such arguments, the jury has the chance 
to hear the defense’s proposed theory of jury nullification, thus 
 
 44. Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of 
Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2588 (1997) (citing Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury 
Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 452 (1988)). Interestingly, Irwin A. Horowitz’ study found that a jury 
is even more likely to nullify when it is informed of its nullification power by an attorney as 
opposed to being so informed by a judge. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of 
Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 
446 (1988). 
 45. Crispo, supra note 13, at 56. 
 46. Id. (quoting Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury Nullification: When May and 
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 250 (1993), reprinted in JACK 
B. WEINSTEIN, 4 VOIR DIRE 5, 9 (1995)). 
 47. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 135 (citing Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullification 
And Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 832 n.37 (1990); United States v. Moylan, 
417 F.2d 1002, 1006–07 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v 
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 982 (8th 
Cir. 1983); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 48. See Huestis, supra note 38, at 89–94 (arguing that defense attorneys should be allowed 
to argue jury nullification to the jury in closing arguments). 
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giving the jury “something to ‘hang their hats on’ if they choose to 
acquit.”49 Of course, allowing argument in favor of jury nullification 
would also allow the prosecution to rebut the defense’s argument 
and explain why the jurors should convict notwithstanding.50 
Currently, jurisdictions are split regarding whether attorneys can 
address jury nullification in closing arguments.51 
Courts can also use voir dire to limit jury nullification by asking 
questions to discover and excuse jurors that are likely to engage in 
jury nullification.52 Specifically, a court can “focus on the jurors’ 
ability to follow the law, to be a fair judge of all witnesses, to set 
aside personal beliefs and biases, to overcome personal opinions 
towards the defendant, and to disregard the penalty when making a 
decision.”53 Past cases in certain jurisdictions went so far as to 
require jurors to be asked about their views of the death penalty and 
to exclude those that are against it out of fear that such jurors would 
nullify a death penalty case (although the Supreme Court later 
prohibited that practice).54 Since voir dire happens before every trial 
as part of jury selection, many attorneys and judges ask questions of 
this nature and exclude jurors based on their responses.55 
Additionally, a court may limit nullification by requiring jurors to 
take an oath to uphold the laws whether or not the jurors agree with 
them, and the judge can then remind the jurors that they have taken 
 
 49. Id. at 96. 
 50. Id. at 100. 
 51. See id. at 90–92 (discussing United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(allowing jury nullification argument); New Hampshire v. Elvin Mayo, Jr., 480 A.2d 85 (N.H. 
1984) (allowing jury nullification argument); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102 (11th Cir. 
1983) (not allowing jury nullification argument); United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405 (11th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 962 (1998) (not allowing jury nullification argument)). 
 52. Crispo, supra note 13, at 52, 54–55 (“The court can help prevent jury nullification by 
conducting a thorough examination of potential jurors during the voir dire process. . . . During 
such an examination of the venire, if a juror states that due to personal beliefs he or she will be 
unable to follow the law, the juror will be excused.”). 
 53. Id. at 52. Specifically, the court can ask questions such as the following: “Is there 
anyone here who would not have the courage to tell me that a fellow juror refuses to follow the 
law or has violated his or her oath?” Id. “Would you be able to follow the law whether or not 
you believe in the law?” Id. “[I]s there any reason whatsoever why you could not apply the law, 
as given to you by the court, to the facts as you find them, as judges of those facts, and be fair to 
each of the parties?” Id. at 55. 
 54. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW 224, 235 (1970) 
(citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1968)). 
 55. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 405 (citing as an example, United States v. James, No. 
98-1479, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1738, at *6 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000)). 
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this oath.56 In conjunction with such an oath, judges have held 
jurors in contempt for violating it.57 Similarly, jurors have been 
prosecuted for perjury when authorities learned of their 
nullification.58 Additionally, courts have used less aggressive 
methods to punish jurors who engage in nullification in violation of 
his oath: simply dismissing him from the jury.59 
Finally, courts can encourage jury nullification by allowing the 
defense to admit evidence in support of a nullification argument.60 
In this way, judges exercise leniency on relevancy requirements,61 
allowing the defense to tell a story that justifies or excuses the 
defendant’s behavior even though the story does not support a 
specific legal defense theory.62 Consider an example from a gun 
control case where the only elements of the charged crime were 
whether the defendant was a convicted felon and whether he 
possessed a firearm.63 Notwithstanding its irrelevance regarding 
guilt, the court allowed evidence that the defendant voluntarily 
turned his firearm in to law enforcement, that the defendant had 
very little education, and that the defendant wanted to be a detective 
and believed that someone preparing to be a detective had to possess 
a firearm.64 The jury subsequently acquitted the defendant, likely 
because of this evidence, which was technically irrelevant to the 
narrow question of guilt under the statute.65 
 
 56. Crispo, supra note 13, at 38 (citing Tony Perry, Snubbing the Law to Vote on Conscience, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at A5)). 
 57. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 402 (“In People v. Kriho, [996 P.2d 158 (Colo. App. 
1999)], the trial court held a juror in contempt after he advocated jury nullification to another 
juror.”). 
 58. Id. at 403 (“In a more recent case, a juror was charged with perjury after 
reportedly declaring during jury deliberations ‘that she could not vote to convict because 
she answered to a higher power than the judge.’”) (citing John Tiffany, Juror Nullifies Judge: 
Teacher Charged with Respecting Constitution, AM. FREE PRESS, Mar. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.americanfreepress.net/html/juror_nullifies_judge.html; Iloilo Marguerite Jones, 
Kamiah, Idaho, IDAHO OBSERVER, Feb. 2006, available at 
http://www.proliberty.com/observer/20060202.htm). 
 59. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614–15 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 60. See Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury Reject 
the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 251 (1993). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 250. 
 63. Id. at 252. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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III. BRIEF HISTORY OF JURY NULLIFICATION 
Jury nullification has always been a part of American 
jurisprudence, notwithstanding courts’ frequent efforts to eliminate 
it. That nullification has historically played a role American 
jurisprudence further legitimizes nullification notwithstanding its 
critics. Specifically, it shows jury nullification has not utterly 
destroyed the rule of law as critics often argue. 
A. Early History 
Many scholars recognize the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton 
in 1544 as the first instance of jury nullification.66 The crown tried 
Throckmorton for high treason based on his uncontested 
participation in Wyatt’s Rebellion.67 However, the jury acquitted 
him because of his political popularity.68 
The first known case of a defendant arguing for jury nullification 
occurred in 1649.69 John Lilburne was tried for treason for 
publishing pamphlets that were critical of the government.70 He 
argued to the jury that the statute under which the government 
prosecuted him was unlawful, and he told the jury that they could 
judge the law for themselves.71 Even though Lilburne had no legal 
defense, the jury acquitted him.72 
Another early case of note is Bushell’s Case.73 This case began as 
the prosecution of William Penn and William Mead for unlawful 
assembly and breach of the peace.74 At the end of the trial, the judge 
instructed the jury, directing them to provide a guilty verdict.75 
However, several members of the jury refused to return a guilty 
 
 66. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 133. 
 67. Id. at 133 & n.16. 
 68. Id. at 133 n.16. 
 69. Parmenter, supra note 11 at 381 (citing The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, 4 
COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1270, 1320–29, 1466 (Old Bailey 1649)). 
 70. Huestis, supra note 38, at 72. 
 71. Id. at 72–73. 
 72. Id. 
 73. (1670), 124 Eng. Rep. 1006. 
 74. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 381 (citing Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the 
Type of Case Matter?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50 (1997)). 
 75. Crispo, supra note 13, at 5 (citing Trial of Penn and Mead, reprinted in 6 T.B. HOWELL, A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 951, 960–61 (London, T.C. Hansard 1816)). 
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verdict, so the judge imprisoned them for contempt.76 The jury 
foreman, Edward Bushell, then filed a writ of Habeas Corpus arguing 
that the court unlawfully imprisoned him.77 Ruling on the Habeas 
petition, the appellate court ruled that a court cannot punish juries 
for their verdicts,78 thereby removing the judge’s power to direct a 
verdict in a criminal case and further enabling juries to nullify. 
Leading up to the Revolutionary War, colonial juries frequently 
exercised their nullification power, principally in maritime cases and 
cases implicating free speech.79 Jury nullification became so common 
that many British prosecutors gave up trying maritime cases because 
conviction seemed hopeless.80 One of the earliest and most famous 
cases of jury nullification in early America was the prosecution of 
John Peter Zenger for seditious libel in New York in 1735.81 Under 
then-existing law, truth was not a defense to an allegation of 
seditious libel; thus, the prosecution needed to prove only that 
Zenger had published the material in question.82 Nevertheless, 
Zenger’s attorney, Alexander Hamilton, conceded that Zenger had 
published the material and attempted to prove the truth of what the 
material said.83 However, the court would not admit evidence 
regarding the truth of what Zenger published, so Hamilton merely 
argued to the jury that its members rely on what they already knew 
and acquit Zenger notwithstanding the lack of a valid legal 
 
 76. Id. at 5–6. 
 77. Shone, supra note 38, at 654. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 382–83 (citing Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, 
A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 874 (1994)). 
 80. Id. at 383 (citing JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 24 (1994)). “One colonial governor of Massachusetts protested, ‘A Custom 
house officer has no chance with a jury.’” Id. at 838 n.37 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 777 (1994) (quoting Notes on Erving v. 
Cradock, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 553, 
557 (1865))). “Another colonial governor complained that ‘trial by jury here is only trying one 
illicit trader by his fellows, or at least by his well-wishers.’” Id. at 838 n.37 (citing STEPHEN 
BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 57 (Knopf 1983) (quoting Governor William 
Shirley)). 
 81. Crispo, supra note 13, at 7 (citing Trial of John Peter Zenger, 9 Geo. 2 (1735), 
reprinted in 17 T.B. Howell, Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials 675 (London, T.C. 
Hansard 1816); William R. Glendon, The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 
48)). 
 82. Crispo, supra note 13 at 7–8. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
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defense.84 In response, the jury nullified the prosecution and 
acquitted Zenger despite the judge’s instruction to convict.85 
B. Evolution of Jury Nullification in the United States 
Soon after the ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court decided the case of Georgia v. Brailsford,86 which held that 
juries can “determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.”87 In 
other words, juries had the right to decide the law and nullify it.88 
Furthermore, lower courts supported this view throughout much of 
the nineteenth century, allowing juries to reject the law as provided 
by judges in criminal cases.89 During this time, abolitionist juries 
showed their disapproval of the fugitive slave laws by acquitting 
defendants who were known to have helped slaves escape to the 
North.90 
United States v. Battiste was the first American case recognized as 
diminishing the jury’s ability to nullify.91 In this case the court 
denied that the jury had a right to interpret the law, but held instead 
that the jury must accept it from the judge.92 Justice Story justified 
this position stating, “[e]very person accused as a criminal has a 
right to be tried according to the law of the land . . . and not by the 
law as a jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 3 U.S. 1 (1794). 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 135 (citing REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 366 
(1980)) (“From 1776 through 1800, only one judge in the United States was known to have 
denied the members of a jury the right to decide law in criminal cases, according to their own 
judgments and consciences. That judge, thereafter, was impeached and removed from the 
bench.”). 
 90. Id. at 134–35. 
 91. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835); Crispo, supra note 13, 
at 9; Parmenter, supra note 11, at 385. Interestingly, Battiste was an abolitionist-era case that was 
reverse of the others discussed so far in this paper. In this case, abolitionists wanted to punish a 
defendant for allegedly enslaving an African in the face of evidence of his innocence rather than 
acquit a defendant for disobeying fugitive slave laws in the face of evidence of guilt. Crispo, supra 
note 13, at 9; Parmenter, supra note 11, at 385. Thus, even though the case is historically 
significant to jury nullification jurisprudence, it represents a case different from those that this 
paper considers. See infra Part II.A. 
 92. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 385. 
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ignorance, or accidental mistake, to interpret it.”93 As the nineteenth 
century came to a close, more courts followed Battiste, denying that 
juries possessed any right to exercise their nullification power.94 
In 1895, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sparf & Hansen 
v. United States,95 after which it has been widely recognized that, 
while juries have the power to nullify, they have no right to do so.96 
Sparf clearly held that it is the duty of the jury to judge the facts, and 
it is the duty of the judiciary to judge the law.97 
Of course, this holding did not remove from the jury the power 
to nullify and acquit when it so chose; Sparf’s effect was merely to 
eliminate jury instructions on jury nullification where not explicitly 
authorized.98 For example, juries in the 1920s frequently exercised 
their nullification power, acquitting defendants charged of violating 
prohibition laws.99 Furthermore, in the 1960s, juries in the South 
frequently nullified cases of racial violence towards blacks.100 
Nevertheless, courts did not frequently address issues surrounding 
jury nullification until the 1970s.101 
Renewed dispute regarding jury nullification came to the 
forefront in the 1970s when the government prosecuted activists for 
engaging in illegal activity while protesting the Vietnam War.102 The 
 
 93. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043. 
 94. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 386. 
 95. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
 96. St. John, supra note 44, at 2563 (quoting Sparf, 156 U.S. at 83) (“[I]t is [the jury’s] 
duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal questions . . . . They have 
the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded as 
rightful . . . .”). 
 97. Crispo, supra note 13, at 11. Specifically Justice John Marshall Harlan stated that the 
jury possesses “the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the court. But I 
deny that . . . they have the moral right to decide the law according to their own notions or 
pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of 
a crime that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. . . . This is the 
right of every citizen, and it is his only protection.” Sparf, 156 U.S. at 74. 
 98. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 389. 
 99. Id. (citing PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 191 (1984)). 
 100. Crispo, supra note 13, at 12. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 137 (citing Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullification 
And Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 836 (1990); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, 
JUDGING THE JURY 156 (1986); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(defendants vandalized Dow Chemical Co., which produced napalm); United States v. Dellinger, 
472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972) (protest demonstrations); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 
515 (9th Cir. 1972) (burned records of local draft board); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 
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attorneys in these cases attempted to have the courts recognize a 
defendant’s right to a jury nullification instruction, allowing the jury 
to judge the morality of the defendants’ actions.103 However, courts 
refused to recognize such a right and did not allow jury instructions 
on nullification.104 One of the most famous cases coming from this 
era was United States v. Dougherty.105 In Dougherty the defendants 
vandalized a business that made napalm for use in the Vietnam 
War.106 The defendants argued that the jury should be instructed 
that it has the right to ignore the law given by the judge and that it 
can choose the law for itself.107 However, the court rejected this 
argument stating, 
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to 
which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as 
a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system 
could long survive if it gave every individual the option of 
disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard 
was judged morally untenable. Toleration of such conduct would 
not be democratic . . . but [would be] inevitably anarchic.108 
The court further reasoned that, while a jury has the power to 
nullify and can legitimately use that power in an extraordinary case, 
a jury instruction on nullification would make nullification far too 
commonplace.109 
 
1002, 1008 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970) (defendants burned draft records to 
protest Vietnam War); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(conscientious objector refused to perform alternate civilian service)). 
 103. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 37, at 137. 
 104. Crispo, supra note 13, at 19. While the reported cases show this conclusion, scholars 
argue that affirming a trial court’s decision to not give a jury instruction on nullification (which 
is what happened in most of these Vietnam War-era cases) is not the same thing as reversing a 
trial court that does give a jury instruction on nullification. Furthermore, there are no reported 
cases of trial courts being reversed or upheld for giving a jury instruction on nullification 
because under Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), the government cannot appeal an 
acquittal by the jury. Thus, some scholars argue that the defense is at a strict disadvantage when 
citing to judicial authority on jury nullification instructions in light of this improbability that 
precedent upholding such a jury instruction should even exist. See Huestis, supra note 38, at 88–
89 (citing Timothy Lynch, Practice Pointer, THE CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 32). 
 105. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Crispo, supra note 13, at 16. 
 106. Crispo, supra note 13, at 16. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133–34 (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 
(4th Cir. 1969)). 
 109. Crispo, supra note 13, at 17. 
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Since the Vietnam War–era cases on jury nullification, courts 
have continued to hear arguments that jury instructions and closing 
arguments on jury nullification should be allowed.110 These 
arguments have been made in a wide variety of cases, including cases 
involving abortion, tax evasion, nuclear weapon protests, and 
statutory rape.111 While most jurisdictions have rejected the 
argument that defendants should be allowed to instruct the jury or 
argue to the jury regarding jury nullification,112 some court decisions 
have allowed defendants to provide instructions or arguments about 
jury nullification.113 In one instance the court allowed nullification-
oriented questions during voir dire as well as instructions and 
argument regarding jury nullification.114 The judge instructed the 
jury that if they did not have sympathy for the government’s case, 
they could acquit the defendant.115 Accordingly the jury acquitted 
the defendant while explaining that they believed there was enough 
evidence to prove guilt but that they did not have sympathy for the 
prosecution.116 
As for current judicial precedent, opinions regarding jury 




 110. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 138. 
 111. Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 46 (7th Cir. 1983) (“abortion 
protest-related abduction of doctor and his wife”); State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I. 1985) 
(“painted ‘thou shall not kill’ on several Trident II submarine missile tubes”); State v. Pease, 740 
P.2d 659 (Mont. 1987) (statutory rape)). Id. at 144 (citing United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 
1206 (9th Cir. 1991) (“instruction refused in tax evasion case”); United States v. Drefke, 707 
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983) (“failing to file income tax returns”); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 
619, 627 (8th Cir. 1978) (“aiding and abetting in the filing of false income tax-related forms”); 
United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974) (“willful failure to file income tax return”); 
United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1988) (“tax evasion and failure to file income 
tax returns”)). 
 112. Crispo, supra note 13, at 23 (“To date, every federal circuit court of appeal considering 
the question has denied the right to a specific instruction on jury nullification and the right of 
defense counsel to directly argue for it.”). 
 113. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 138. 
 114. Id. (citing United States v. Jimmy L. DeSirey, No. 3-90-00083 (M.D. Tenn., Dec. 
1991) (Wiseman, J.); Telephone interview with Robert J. Washko, Assistant United States 
Attorney, Middle District of Kentucky (Aug. 17, 1992)). Note, however, that DeSirey was an 
unreported case, and thus not precedential. See supra note 104. 
 115. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 138. (citing Interview with Robert J. Washko, 
supra note 114). 
 116. Id. (citing Interview with Robert J. Washko, supra note 114). 
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arguments regarding nullification to vague support of nullification 
power without express approval of its exercise.117 
C. Nullification in Constitutions and Proposed Statutes 
Historically, state constitutional provisions have provided 
justification for jury nullification. Three states—Georgia, Indiana, 
and Maryland—have constitutional provisions expressly delegating 
to the jury the power to determine the law in criminal cases.118 The 
Maryland Constitution states, “In the trial of all criminal cases, the 
Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the 
Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction.”119 However, Maryland courts have interpreted that 
clause to mean that the jury can determine the law only when there 
is a legitimate dispute about what the law is and that the clause does 
not refer to any jury nullification right.120 Similarly, the Indiana 
constitution states, “In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall 
have the right to determine the law and the facts,”121 however, the 
Indiana Supreme Court has held that this provision does not allow 
the jury to ignore the law when making decisions.122 
Georgia’s constitution is similar to Maryland’s and Indiana’s. In 
response to a court opinion that the jury could not be the judge of 
the law, Georgia added a jury nullification clause to its constitution 
stating, “In criminal cases, . . . the jury shall be the judges of the 
law and the facts.”123 However, the Georgia Supreme Court has 
since interpreted that constitutional clause and declared that it does 
not create a right for the jury to be instructed that it can judge the 
law.124 These examples of constitutional provisions relating to jury 
nullification show that the drafters of these constitutions intended 
 
 117. See Teresa L. Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 393, 424–42 (2004), for a list of representative cases in each jurisdiction. 
 118. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 391 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11(a) (1998); 
IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CONST. § 23 (LexisNexis 2003)). 
 119. MD. CONST. art. 23 (2012). 
 120. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 391 (citing Barnhard v. State, 587 A.2d 561, 567 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1991) (quoting Stevenson v. State, 423 A.2d 558 (Md. 1980))). 
 121. IND. CONST. art. I, §19 (2010). 
 122. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 391–92 (citing Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the 
Law: Constitutional Entitlement Versus Judicial Interpretation, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 470 (1999)). 
 123. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 391; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11(a) (2009). 
 124. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 391 (citing Berry v. State, 31 S.E. 592, 593 (Ga. 1898); 
Harris v. State, 9 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Ga. 1940)). 
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jury interpretation of the law to play a role in the criminal justice 
system but that courts’ subsequent efforts have made the provisions 
meaningless. 
Contrary to the momentum of judicial precedent—in an effort to 
promote jury nullification—a group called Fully Informed Jury 
Association (FIJA) has lobbied state legislatures to pass laws 
requiring judges to give jury instructions on nullification.125 In many 
states, FIJA successfully proposed such legislation, but no state has 
passed the proposed legislation.126 Thus, it appears that the 
continued existence of jury nullification will likely depend on the 
courts and their precedent. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST JURY NULLIFICATION 
Next, this Comment surveys the academic debate for and against 
jury nullification to provide context for this Comment’s argument in 
support of nullification. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Jury Nullification 
The most common and basic argument in favor of jury 
nullification is that it serves as a protection for the accused against 
abuses by the government.127 Thus, jury nullification “gives 
protection against laws which the ordinary man may regard as harsh 
and oppressive.”128 The Framers “saw the judgment of their peers as 
a [sic] invaluable ally if the distant federal Congress should pass 
oppressive laws or if the federal prosecutors should seek to harass 
citizens by the ‘great instrument of arbitrary power’ that a criminal 
 
 125. Crispo, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
 126. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 397 (citing Julie Johnson, The Jury Nullification Debate, 5 
U.S.A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 142–43 (1994)). FIJA legislation has been introduced in 
Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and South Dakota. Id. at 397 n.179 (citing Fully Informed Jury 
Ass’n, History of FIJA, FIJA.ORG, http://www.fija.org/index.php?page=staticpage&id=3 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2007)). 
 127. See Parmenter, supra note 11, at 411 (“Perhaps the jury’s most important role is ‘to 
prevent oppression by the [g]overnment.’ The jury protects against government oppression by 
safeguarding criminal defendants against ‘the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or 
judge.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968); Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986))). 
 128. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 59 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). 
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prosecution can become.”129 Thus, proponents of jury nullification 
argue that jury nullification was intended to protect against unjust 
laws and unjust application of the law and that this idea accords with 
the Founders’ view of trial by jury.130 
Another common argument in favor of jury nullification is that it 
is an important component of direct democracy.131 Proponents of 
this argument claim that jury nullification plays a democratic role in 
several ways. First, it serves as a check and balance against the 
various branches of the government.132 Next, jury nullification 
serves as another way for the people to signal to the various 
branches of government regarding desirable policy and legislation.133 
Finally, jury nullification serves a democratic function of infusing 
community values into the court system.134 
Constitutionally, proponents of jury nullification argue that 
inasmuch as courts suppress a jury’s nullification power, the courts 
infringe on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by 
jury.135 Other proponents argue that jury nullification can serve as 
an important protection of minorities’ rights against oppression from 
the majority136 and that jury nullification creates greater legitimacy 




 129. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 1070 (4th ed. 2010) (quoting NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 426 (1998)). 
 130. Van Dyke, supra note 54, at 234. 
 131. Shone, supra note 38, at 660. 
 132. Brown, supra note 14, at 1186. See also Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & 
Sentencing, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 337 (2002). 
 133. Brown, supra note 14 at 1186–87. But see Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An 
Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 419–23 (1988) (arguing against 
jury nullification because it is used as an illegitimate vehicle of political debate). 
 134. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 137. 
 135. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 412–15. 
 136. Id. at 398–99 (citing LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 206–07 
(1852)). Since all members of a jury have to vote to convict, a minority can protect itself as long 
as only one member of the minority, or one person sympathetic to the minority, is on the jury. 
 137. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 183 
(1972) [hereinafter Scheflin, Right to Say No] (“A juror who is forced by the judge’s instructions 
to convict a defendant whose conduct he applauds, or at least feels is justifiable, will lose respect 
for the legal system which forces him to reach such a result against the dictates of his 
conscience.”). See also Alan W. Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: the Contours of a 
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980). 
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Finally, proponents of jury nullification argue that it makes no 
sense to have juries if they are not allowed to nullify.138 Some argue 
that beyond the psychological aspect, juries provide no benefit to 
defendants when their only task is to determine the facts.139 These 
scholars argue that the juries often determine facts more poorly than 
judges do, so there must be something more than mere fact finding 
that juries are intended to do.140 
B. Arguments Against Jury Nullification 
The most common argument against jury nullification is that it 
undermines the rule of law.141 When considering jury nullification, 
critics worry that if courts allow jurors to “deliberate whether they 
happened to agree with the law, then there effectively would be no 
law at all, only an anarchy of conscience, an unpredictable series of 
ad hoc judgments by isolated groups of twelve.”142 Therefore, critics 
argue, jury nullification as a part of the law must be rejected to 
preserve “a government of laws and not of men.”143 
Furthermore, critics of jury nullification disagree that 
nullification enhances democracy in any way.144 They argue that 
“[t]he lack of any juror accountability principle is what makes jury 
nullification so hard to justify on democratic terms.”145 
 
 138. Van Dyke, supra note 54, at 231 (“If we are not going to give the jury the right to 
nullify the law, is the institution of the jury worth preserving?”). 
 139. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 
415 (1954) (“Aside from the incidental psychological functions which the criminal jury is 
alleged to perform, the sole remaining virtue claimed for it lies in its ability to make allowances 
for the circumstances of the particular case—to dispense with a rule of law.”). 
 140. Van Dyke, supra note 54, at 232–33 (“The jury brings no particular talent to the task 
of finding facts and frequently approaches its duty in a haphazard fashion. . . . Although data 
on the jury’s ability to evaluate evidence is less conclusive than we might like it to be, we can 
say, at the very least, that it has not been shown that jurors are better fact-finders than judges, 
and quite probably they are worse. Why then do we impanel some 1,000,000 jurors in 80,000 
criminal trials and an untold additional number in civil trials each year? Are we throwing away 
our money because of some unfounded illusion? Or do we preserve the jury because, though we 
will not admit it, we really want the jury to do more than find facts?”). 
 141. See Crispo, supra note 13, at 3; Brown, supra note 14, at 1150–51; St. John, supra note 
44, at 2564. 
 142. Jeffery Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberations, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 147 
(1998). 
 143. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 144. Broeder, supra note 139, at 387 (“While the jury may be a popular symbol of 
democracy, it is in one sense the antithesis of democratic government.”). 
 145. Abramson, supra note 142, at 150. 
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Furthermore, they assert that “[t]he argument [of] jury democracy 
falters because juries can neither represent nor embody the 
community or its will. Not only do juries fail to reflect an adequate 
demographic sample of the community, but their voting rules make 
them minoritarian rather than majoritarian bodies.”146 Critics 
further argue that the personal biases and opinions of twelve people 
in a jury fail to serve as a democratic representation of the 
community’s opinion.147 
Finally, jury nullification critics argue that nullification creates 
too much uncertainty for criminal defendants. Assuming juries have 
the right to nullify, a defendant will go into trial not knowing 
whether the whims of the jury will hold him accountable for a crime 
he committed or not.148 Additionally, critics worry that increased 
jury nullifications resulting in acquittals will also result in increased 
nullifications resulting in wrongful convictions.149 
V. JURY NULLIFICATION IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR BALANCING 
COMPETING INTERESTS AND SHOULD NOT BE REPRESSED 
This Comment argues that jury nullification is an important tool 
for balancing government interests with individual rights and that 
courts should not repress its use. Jury nullification balances 
government interests with individual rights by serving as a check and 
balance within the structure of government, by serving as an 
additional level of discretionary review, and by allowing common 
human experience to temper the oft-times rigid application of the 
law. 
 
 146. St. John, supra note 44, at 2578. 
 147. Id. at 2582 (“Whatever the current democratic deficiencies of legislatures, authorized 
jury nullification seems an unsatisfying remedy, for while it does bring wider citizen 
participation in government, it allows the personal biases and predilections of individual 
citizens, rather than the sentiment of the community at large, to shape the law for each criminal 
trial.”). 
 148. See Abramson, supra note 142, at 149 (discussing nullification cases of Michigan’s 
assisted suicide law) (“First, some Michigan juries may enforce the assisted suicide law even as 
others balk. Unless case-specific variables can explain the different verdicts, Michigan ends up 
with a balkanized situation where the law on assisted suicide is what any particular jury says it 
is.”). 
 149. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 144 (“Although jury nullification proponents 
argue in terms of acquittal, a jury possesses the potential of exhibiting a darker side; juries just 
as easily can convict an innocent defendant unlawfully as they mercifully can acquit a guilty 
one.” (citing REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 368 (1980))). 
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A. Jury Nullification as Checks and Balances within Government 
Checks and balances within government are a fundamental 
principle of the Constitution and of American jurisprudence in 
general. Checks and balances in government allow each branch of 
government to limit the others’ power, thereby restraining each 
individual branch’s abuse of government power. For example, the 
President checks the legislature with his veto power.150 The 
President and the Senate check the judiciary with their power to 
appoint judges.151 The judiciary checks the executive and legislative 
branches by reviewing Congress’s enacted statutes and the 
executive’s administration of those statutes.152 
Other less known or less recognized checks and balances in 
American government also serve to limit government abuse of 
power. For example, the judiciary’s power is checked by the rule that 
it can hear only cases that are in controversy.153 Additionally, 
Congress’s division into two houses serves as a check and balance on 
highly populated states’ power to abuse less populated states and 
vice versa. And Federalism principles within the Constitution also 
limit the federal government’s power to abuse states,154 as well as 
the states’ power to abuse individuals protected by the federal 
government’s authority.155 
Like some of these more subtle examples, jury nullification 
serves as a check on the abuse of government power. Broadly 
speaking, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial serves as a 
fundamental check to prevent government abuse.156 In Duncan v. 
Louisiana,157 the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial in criminal cases into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, making the right applicable to the states.158 In its 
opinion, the Court stated, “[a] right to jury trial is granted to 
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the 
 
 150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 151. See id. art. II, § 2. 
 152. See id. art. III, § 2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. amend. X. 
 155. See id. amend. XIV. 
 156. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 39, at 142 (citing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 
229 (1977)). 
 157. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 158. Id. at 149. 
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Government.”159 The Court continued emphasizing that even 
though the Framers of the Constitution attempted to create an 
independent judiciary, criminal defendants needed further protection 
from potential abuses by the government.160 The Court further 
explained how a jury trial limits the government’s ability to abuse 
power by asserting, 
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers 
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense 
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less 
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.161 
The Court further explained that the right to a jury trial shows a 
conscious decision not to allow a single government entity, such as a 
judge, to have absolute power over the life and liberty of an 
individual. And finally, the Court stated, “[f]ear of unchecked power, 
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, 
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon 
community participation in the determination of guilt or 
innocence.”162 
These statements by the Court reveal that one of the main 
purposes of a jury trial is to act as a protection (or a check) against 
the government. However, without jury nullification, the 
effectiveness of such a check is greatly diminished because the jury 
would be forced to rigidly apply the law just as the judge would.163 
“Nullification decisions check prosecutorial discretion against the 
public values and social norms we recognize from judicial 
interpretation of statutes and from the full description of the rule of 
law.”164 Furthermore, without the power to nullify, the jury simply 
becomes a tool—a rubber-stamp—for the government to use 
however it wishes.165 
 
 159. Id. at 155. 
 160. Id. at 156. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Parmenter, supra note 11, at 398 (“According to Spooner, for the jury to have any 
significance, it must have the right to refuse to apply the law.” (citing LYSANDER SPOONER, AN 
ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 5 (1852))). 
 164. Brown, supra note 14, at 1190. 
 165. See Parmenter, supra note 11, at 398 (citing LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE 
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Through exercise of its nullification power, a jury can provide a 
check on legislatures to protect against unjust laws, a check on 
prosecutors that are unjustly applying the laws, and a check on 
judges who may be interpreting the law with too much rigidity. Jury 
nullification can also serve as a useful tool in balancing federalism, 
protecting states from the federal government’s encroachments into 
what have traditionally been the states’ determinations of criminal 
liability.166 For example, it can protect people who rely on state law 
that allows certain behavior while the federal government attempts 
to prosecute that same behavior. A current example of this is jury 
nullification’s ability to protect people from federal convictions in 
states that have legalized the use of marijuana.167 Jury nullification 
could also have practical implications in a hypothetical—yet 
foreseeably possible—case in which federal law requires people 
authorized to perform marriages to perform them for both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples while some states’ laws may 
still be resistant to such a requirement. In this way, jury nullification 
would act as an additional check or limitation, preventing abuse of 
government power. 
B. Jury Nullification as an Additional Level of Discretionary Review 
Related to its role as a check on government power, jury 
nullification serves as an additional level of discretionary review, and 
recognizing it as such helps resolve criticisms that nullification 
defies the rule of law. Before any criminal case gets to trial, 
numerous government employees exercise wide ranges of discretion 
to determine whether the defendant’s conduct deserves 
prosecution.168 Initially, the police investigate alleged criminal 
behavior and decide whether to pass the information on to the 
prosecutor’s office for criminal charges.169 Discretionary decisions 
by police officers not to pursue criminal charges are subject to very 
little consistent review; at most, officers’ supervisors review such 
 
TRIAL BY JURY 5 (1852)). 
 166. Id. at 424–25. 
 167. Id. at 425–26 (discussing United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2006), a 
case in which a defendant was federally prosecuted for growing marijuana in accordance with 
California’s Compassionate Use Act). 
 168. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 129, at 813. 
 169. Id. 
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decisions.170 After a case has been sent to the prosecutor’s office, the 
prosecutor has almost unlimited discretion to choose not to file 
charges, even when the defendant’s behavior clearly violated a 
criminal law.171 When making such decisions, prosecutors often 
consider factors that are not relevant to a strict application of the 
law.172 Like police officers’ decisions, such decisions are likely 
subject to review only by the prosecutor’s supervisor, who is also a 
prosecutor.173 Once charges have been filed, judges exercise 
discretion (although their discretion is highly limited by statutes and 
precedent) to determine whether to grant a motion to dismiss or 
whether to bind a defendant over for trial after a preliminary 
hearing.174 
Like the discretionary decisions of police officers and 
prosecutors, jury nullification is simply an exercise of the jury’s 
discretion regarding whether criminal punishment is appropriate in a 
given case.175 Just as police and prosecutors take into consideration 
factors such as whether the defendant’s behavior was merely a 
technical violation or whether other circumstances not formally 
recognized by the law justified or excused a defendant’s actions, so 
serves jury nullification to weed out inappropriate prosecutions 
where police and prosecutors failed to do so.176 
This view of jury nullification substantially rebuts criticism that 
nullification violates the rule of law because this view reveals that 
discretionary decisions to not enforce a law are not as large a 
problem as critics argue; such discretion is exercised every day in 
 
 170. Id. (citing Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial 
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997)). 
 171. Brown, supra note 14, at 1189 (“We fully accept that prosecutors have discretion to 
apply criminal law or not according to their own judgment, into which they are readily allowed 
to consider moral or social policy factors well beyond the facts’ relation to statutory elements. 
Rare is the contention that prosecutorial discretion is ‘lawless,’ as opposed to merely ill-
advised.”). 
 172. See Richman, supra note 170, at 957–58. 
 173. See id. (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
207–08 (1969)). 
 174. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 129, at 813–14. 
 175. Scheflin, Right to Say No, supra note 137, at 181 (“Proper understanding of the concept 
of jury nullification requires it to be viewed as an exercise of discretion in the administration of 
law and justice.”). 
 176. See Brown, supra note 14, at 1191 (“How the jury carries out its job of applying law, 
then, even when it nullifies, is not different in kind from how prosecutors, judges, and attorneys 
interpret and enforce laws.”); Scheflin, Right to Say No, supra note 137, at 181. 
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police and prosecutors’ offices, so it seems irrational to claim that 
such discretion exercised on occasion by a jury would lead to anarchy 
and the end of the rule of law.177 
Countering, critics argue that jury nullification is a poor exercise 
of discretion because juries are not trained in the law and because 
they do not have the experience that police and prosecutor have in 
screening cases.178 However, juries are useful as an additional level 
of discretionary review exactly because they are not trained in the 
law: they are looking at the case from a common sense point of view. 
Such a common sense point of view is necessary to properly balance 
the rule of law with the fair application of justice—or an application 
of the law in accordance with the spirit of the law—because a purely 
legal approach, such as that taken by lawyers and judges, can often 
result in harsh results. 
Furthermore, juries are actually better suited to exercise 
“discretionary non-enforcement” for several reasons.179 One reason 
juries may be better suited to screen cases is that juries do not need 
to appear that they are “tough on crime to ensure [their] re-
election.”180 Another reason is that juries are “a group of local 
citizens who must live in the community into which they either 
might set criminals free or live with officials who violate rules. In 
light of that, the jury seems an appropriately cautious body to trust 
with the power to make such [discretionary decisions].”181 
Furthermore, “[t]here is strong empirical evidence that prosecutorial 
 
 177. Abramson, supra note 142, at 148 (“Pluralists suggest that there is no inherent 
contradiction between respecting the rule of law and mercifully refusing to enforce the law in 
certain circumstances. When police exercise their discretion not to arrest a person they lawfully 
could; when prosecutors exercise their discretion not to indict the arrested person or to indict 
only for a lesser charge than the maximum available, no one claims that such discretion is 
lawless or destructive of law’s uniformity. Instead, enforcing the letter of the law too strictly 
undermines public respect for the law and may well result in applying the law to circumstances 
that the legislature did not foresee or intend to cover. Jury nullification can serve similar 
purposes, for there is no reason to believe that jurors as a group will exercise their discretion to 
be lenient any less responsibly than police and prosecutors exercise theirs. Wholesale rejection 
of jury nullification seems to rest on the mistaken premise that every departure from uniformity 
undermines the rule of law, whereas in fact one of the basic norms of the rule of law is that each 
case is to be judged on its own merits.”). 
 178. St. John, supra note 44, at 2587. 
 179. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 422 (citing United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 
F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Brown, supra note 14, at 1178. 
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discretion contributes more significantly to disproportionate capital 
sentences across classes of defendant groups than jury discretion 
does.”182 Thus, jury nullification adds an additional level of 
discretion that provides value to the criminal justice system. 
C. Jury Nullification Tempers Rigid Application of the Law 
Finally, jury nullification balances government and individual 
interests by tempering the rigid application of the law. Often the 
“letter of the law” interferes with the “spirit of the law.” This is 
because the law applies to human behavior and the human 
experience is impossible to fully describe in a criminal law code. A 
scholar writing about jury nullification articulated this idea and jury 
nullification’s role: 
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is 
because law is a general rule . . . while justice is the fairness of 
this precise case under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law 
only takes account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed at 
average results, law and justice every so often do not coincide. . . . 
Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its 
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the 
particular case.183 
Therefore, jury nullification allows justice, or the spirit of the 
law, to be served in extreme cases, yet it leaves the state of the law 
unchanged in average cases, in part because it lacks precedential 
authority.184 
Juries are particularly well suited to perform this function of 
balancing the written law with practical concerns of justice and 
fairness. One reason they are well suited is that they consist of a 
number of people who must arrive at a unanimous decision. Often, 
jurors must thoroughly discuss the issues in a trial—thus taking 
appropriate care to correctly decide the issues before them—before 
 
 182. Id. at 1197 (citing David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial 
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 366 (1994) (recounting empirical evidence that discriminatory 
“race-of-victim effects were principally the product of prosecutorial plea-bargaining decisions 
and prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences in death-eligible cases”)). 
 183. Scheflin, Right to Say No, supra note 137, at 182 (quoting John H. Wigmore, A Program 
for the Trial of a Jury, 12 AM. JUD. SOC. 166 (1929)). 
 184. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 399 (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910)). 
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they can agree on a verdict.185 Additionally, juries know less about 
the law than judges, but their knowledge of social norms and 
practices help them weigh both sides.186 Finally, empirical evidence 
shows that jurors try to do the right thing; they “take their role 
seriously, approach it conscientiously, and are capable of making 
complex moral judgments.”187 
D. Courts Should Not Discourage Jury Nullification 
Because jury nullification serves as a useful tool of checks and 
balances, because it adds an additional level of discretion, and 
because it appropriately tempers the rigid application of the law, 
courts should adopt measures that do not repress jury nullification. 
It is important to stress that this Comment’s recommendation is 
that courts should be careful to not repress jury nullification; this 
Comment does not advocate that courts explicitly recommend or 
actively encourage nullification. Notwithstanding jury nullification’s 
admirable qualities, as with any philosophy, too much of a good 
thing can be a bad thing and an appropriate balance should be 
sought. Therefore, courts should not aggressively encourage 
nullification such that the rule of law truly ceases to exist as critics 
of nullification fear. Furthermore, to serve as an effective check on 
government power, juries should be relatively free from government 
encouragement in either direction. 
As an example of a method that does not discourage nullification 
while also not promoting it, the ABA’s February 2013 resolution to 
modify the Model Grand Jury Charge188 provides a suggestion that 
 
 185. Broeder, supra note 139, at 388 (“The jury system also supposes that the judgment of 
twelve men whose differences are resolved through open-minded discussion is better than the 
judgment of one man whose trial experience is far more extensive. Although it is historically a 
matter of doubt, the reason for requiring unanimous agreement among jurors can easily be 
viewed as an attempt to give litigants the benefit of a full and complete discussion of disputed 
issues. The requirement of twelve men is conceivably an effort to ensure that here will be 
differences to discuss. One man cannot differ with his own judgment and any less than twelve 
men will reduce the probability of differences to be discussed. A fundamental tenet of the jury 
tradition, then, lies in its assumption that controverted factual issues are best resolved through 
reasoned discussion and debate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 186. Brown, supra note 14, at 1198. 
 187. Parmenter, supra note 11, at 420 (citing Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, 
Culpability, and Punishment, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 705 (2000)). 
 188. American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates 104J (Feb. 2013), 
available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/13606139612013_hod_ 
midyear_meeting_104j.pdf. While this resolution relates to grand juries and indictments—as 
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balances jury nullification considerations well. Specifically, the ABA 
recommended that the last sentence in paragraph 25 be changed 
from “. . . you should vote to indict where the evidence presented to 
you is sufficiently strong. . . .” to “. . . you may vote to indict only 
where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong. . . .”189 
The ABA recommended this change because telling a grand jury that 
it “should vote to indict” implies that it has the duty to do so even 
though no such duty exists.190 Most importantly, changing the 
wording to “may vote to indict” allows the grand jury to exercise 
some discretion and not strictly apply the law to cases brought 
before them by the prosecutor.191 However, the proposed change 
also addresses the concerns of nullification critics in that it does not 
expressly instruct the grand jury that it has the power to nullify.192 
Thus, the instruction leaves grand jurors free to nullify. But without 
express permission, they are likely to nullify only in extreme cases. 
Likewise, judges should instruct petite juries that if the prosecutor 
has proven his case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may convict 
the defendant—as opposed to an instruction that in such cases the 
jury must or should convict. 
Furthermore, courts can take other measures to avoid repressing 
jury nullification in appropriate cases. For example, courts should 
exercise their discretion to allow closing arguments for and against 
jury nullification in appropriate cases. It is difficult to say exactly 
what the limits of that discretion should be. However, granting that 
discretion to judges allows an appropriate balance to be struck so 
that jury nullification is allowed to happen but so that it is not taken 
to an extreme. 
Additionally, courts should exercise their discretion to admit 
evidence relevant to a nullification theory. For example, the court in 
the John Peter Zenger case193 refused to admit evidence of the 
 
opposed to petit juries and verdicts—the same principles and ideas relating to jury nullification 
apply. 
 189. Id. (emphasis added to show what words have been changed). 
 190. See id. at 2. 
 191. Id. at 2–3. 
 192. Many critics of jury nullification worry that if juries are instructed on their power to 
nullify, then they will nullify more often. St. John, supra note 44, at 2588 (citing Irwin A. 
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury 
Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988)). 
 193. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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truthfulness of Zenger’s published remarks because, according to the 
law, such evidence was irrelevant. However, it should have allowed 
admission of such evidence to allow the defendant to tell his side of 
the story so that the jury could have made its decision based on the 
full context of the case. Knowledge of the full context of a case is 
particularly important when a jury performs its discretionary 
screening function, just as the context is often important when 
prosecutors perform their screening function. In making 
determinations of admissibility, courts should balance the value of a 
jury being able to hear the defendant’s entire story with the costs of 
the factors listed in Federal Rules of Evidence 403: “danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,” and 
“considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Jury nullification jurisprudence presents an interesting 
contradiction: “We discourage nullification at the same time we 
preserve it. Nullification is illicit yet strongly protected.”194 Given 
jury nullification’s elusive nature and complex history, courts 
considering jury nullification face a difficult challenge. However, 
when faced with that challenge, courts should be very careful not to 
eliminate jury nullification from practice or from American 
jurisprudence. While a court may be tempted to restrict a jury’s 
power in order to increase its own, the court must remember that 
juries play a role in the criminal justice system that no other 
participant can replace. 
 





 194. Brown, supra note 14, at 1199. 
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